The National Politics of EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans by Ker-Lindsay, James et al.
The National Politics of EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans 
 
James Ker-Lindsay, Ioannis Armakolas, Rosa Balfour and Corina Stratulat 
 
 
 
 
Enlargement is at the heart of the European project. It is widely considered as one of 
the European Union’s most successful policies. Notwithstanding the decision of the 
United Kingdom to leave the European Union, a community that began with just six 
members has now grown to 28.1 Looking ahead, it appears almost certain that we will 
see a further expansion in the future. Although Turkey is the largest and most 
prominent of the countries vying to join the EU, its prospects of membership appear 
to have all but disappeared. Democratic backsliding (Öktem and Akkoyunlu, 2016), 
coupled with growing political and popular opposition to its membership across the 
EU (Gerhards and Hans, 2011), means that Turkish accession is now highly unlikely 
in anything other than the long term, if ever. Instead, the focus of attention is now 
firmly fixed on the six countries of the Western Balkans – Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia.2  
 
However, the course of enlargement into the Western Balkans also comes with its 
own set of difficulties. It is a region that is still recovering from the bitter conflicts of 
the 1990s. It is beset by a range of security issues, including corruption, organised 
crime, secessionist challenges, and religious extremism. It is also poorer than the rest 
of the European Union (Linotte, 2017). Moreover, in recent years authoritarian 
tendencies have been on the rise throughout the Western Balkans. The negative 
effects of policies by regional strongmen can be seen in the judiciary, the media and 
civil society. (The democratic regress in the region is often identified in the newly-
coined term ‘stabilitocracy’ (Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group, 2017).) This 
has raised concerns about its capacity to integrate as well as fears about mass 
emigration once the region joins the EU. Despite this, the process of Western Balkan 
enlargement is also seen as vital for the European Union. For many, it is a natural 
next stage for the EU. It represents a chance to fill a ‘hole’ on the map of Europe 
(Avery, 2007). At a time of crisis and doubt within the EU, the accession process 
indirectly demonstrates how EU membership is still seen as a positive force. 
 
The problem is that, when expressed in these stark terms of security costs and 
existential benefits, a rather binary picture emerges of a European polity that is either 
in favour of expansion or against it. In truth, the picture is far more complicated than 
this. Across the members of the European Union, we can see a range of attitudes 
towards enlargement. While some countries may see a logic to expansion, they may 
worry about crime. Others may see the benefits of an increasing pool of workers, but 
worry about how they will integrate. Public attitudes are also complex. While in some 
key countries enlargement fatigue and opposition to new members has very high 
percentage rates, things look more optimistic in other member states (Balfour and 
Stratulat, 2015). These attitudes are often shaped by domestic political debates, not 
                                                     
1 Founders (1957): Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg; United Kingdom, 
Ireland and Denmark (1973); Greece (1981); Spain and Portugal (1986); Austria, Sweden and Finland 
(1995); Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Cyprus and 
Malta (2004); Bulgaria and Romania (2007); Croatia (2013). 
2 For most of the last twenty years, the Western Balkans has usually been defined as the former 
Yugoslavia plus Albania and minus Slovenia. Arguably, this changed in 2013, when Croatia became 
the latest country to join the EU. In the context of this work, the Western Balkans are defined as the six 
countries vying to join the EU. 
only in terms of the overall policy towards enlargement, but also as regards national 
attitudes and policies towards the Western Balkans. Rarely, however, do these 
national discussions receive a wider airing. In many ways, they are the untold stories 
that remain out of sight to other members. To this end, this volume is an attempt to 
redress this lacuna in our understanding of enlargement. It highlights the way in 
which enlargement in general, and expansion in the Western Balkans, is understood 
and debated within several in national settings across member states. 
 
 
Understanding national support for enlargement 
 
As well as having a valuable role to play in terms of understanding the specific 
national policy dimensions of enlargement, this volume is also intended to contribute 
to a better understanding of the relationship between national politics and EU 
enlargement. Until now, there appears to have been a tendency to view enlargement in 
institutional terms. There is a sense amongst many observers that expansion has been 
driven by some sort of monolithic agenda. The EU, acting as a unified body, has 
pursued expansion as part of its fundamental reason for being.  
 
According to traditional views on enlargement, the mission to expand the European 
Union is based on a logic of wider political and geographic integration that will, 
eventually, see the EU incorporate all the countries of Europe – however ill-defined 
this may be the concept of Europe may be. The very first line of the founding Treaty 
of Rome proclaims the desire of the people of Europe to pursue ‘ever greater union’. 
But the idea of expansion as a settled EU policy extends beyond this foundational 
principle. Hand in hand with this runs the idea that enlargement is part and parcel of a 
wider policy of advancing European values in the world (Haukkala, 2011). The EU is 
also regarded as a reforming body. It is understood to play a transformative role that 
will radically redefine, and improve, the economic, political and social conditions 
within aspiring members (Grabbe 2015; 2014; De Munter, 2017). From equal pay and 
minority rights to health and safety standards and the ability to move freely across the 
members, the European Union is seen to improve the lives of the hundreds of millions 
of European citizens across the continent. Expansion therefore draws more into this 
fold of personal prosperity and security. Importantly, much of the appeal of the idea 
of transformation through Europeanization in the Western Balkans is predicated on 
the previous example of Central European countries, an experiment widely considered 
successful (Grabbe, 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). Lastly, and 
perhaps most notably, the European Union is conceived as being one of the finest 
examples of conflict management in human history. This notion is exceedingly 
powerful in European thinking and numerous studies have engaged with the idea of 
EU’s positive impact on conflict dynamics in European peripheries and beyond (see, 
for example, Coppieters et.al. (2004), Diez et.al. (2006), Hughes (2009) and various 
contributions in the special issue of the journal Ethnopolitics). In many ways, it 
represents the founding myth of the EU. The award of the Nobel Prize for Peace to 
the EU, in 2012, served to cement this narrative of the EU as the conflict management 
mechanism par excellence.3 
 
However, while there has been an extensive body of literature that has looked at 
enlargement, and the underlying reasons why the European Union as a unified 
political entity has wanted to enlarge, and the ways in which this process has been 
undertaken either at the EU side or the membership hopefuls’ side (Grabbe and 
                                                     
3 For more information, see the website of the Nobel Prize. 
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2012/  
Hughes, 1998; Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003; Sedelmeir, 2005; Schimmelfennig, 
2007; 2005; Vachudova, 2014), relatively little work has been done on the reasons 
why individual member states have supported, or sometimes opposed, the process of 
enlargement. What has been missing from this wider, institutionalist understanding of 
enlargement has been a recognition that behind this aggregated support for 
enlargement lies a myriad of national policy agendas. Simply put, empirical 
investigations of member states’ policies have tended to be missing in accounts of 
enlargement. (Some exceptions include Balfour and Stratulat, 2015; Moravcsik and 
Vachudova, 2003; Smeets, 2015.) 
 
The scarcity of nationally focused analyses of EU enlargement begs an obvious 
question. While it is possible to discern a broader, institutional rationale for 
enlargement, how do we understand the rationale of individual member states to 
pursue enlargement? Here a complex picture emerges. To be sure, in many cases the 
wider logic of integration applies. For many states, the idea of an ever-expanding 
union, dedicated to greater integration, is a national policy objective as much as it is 
the wider goal of the EU. However, there is often so much more to national support 
for enlargement than an idealised vision of an EU that incorporates all the countries of 
Europe from westernmost Ireland to easternmost Cyprus and from northernmost 
Finland to southernmost Malta. Upon closer examination, it becomes clear that there 
are a multitude of separate national reasons for supporting enlargement. As well as a 
wish to enhance integration, manage conflict, encourage reform, promote economic 
development, and prevent closer political integration, the enlargement agenda has also 
been driven by narrower national interests, such as support for traditional allies. These 
wider views are neatly captured in the way in which different members approach the 
question of EU enlargement in the Western Balkans. 
 
 
EU enlargement in the Western Balkans 
 
While it is perhaps tempting for external observers to think of the region as a single 
bloc, there is huge variation between the countries when it comes to their integration 
progress. Leading the pack is Montenegro. As of October 2017, it has opened 
negotiations on 28 of the 35 chapters of the acquis communautaire, the EU’s body of 
laws, and has provisionally closed negotiations on three of these. At present, it is still 
unclear when it will be ready to join. Some have suggested that it could be as early as 
2022.4 However, the actual date depends not only on when it finishes its negotiations, 
but also on how long it will take for its accession treaty to be ratified by the 
parliaments of the current members. In the case of Croatia, the most recent country to 
join the EU, this took almost two years. Nevertheless, barring a surprise, it seems 
almost certain that Montenegro will be the next member of the EU. 
 
After Montenegro, the next most likely member is Serbia. It has opened 10 chapters 
so far, and provisionally closed two. While it is some way behind Montenegro, it has 
made enormous progress on its accession path. Some have even suggested that it may 
yet be possible that Montenegro and Serbia could join at the same time.5 However, 
this seems unlikely. A more realistic date would perhaps be 2025. The big question 
mark that hangs over Serbian accession is the question of Kosovo. Serbia has still not 
recognised its 2008 unilateral declaration of independence. Although the EU has led a 
process of dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, which aims at the normalisation of 
                                                     
4 ‘Darmanović: Montenegro becomes EU member in 2022’, European Western Balkans, 20 April 
2017. 
5 ‘Juncker chides EU candidate Turkey, upbeat on Western Balkans’, Reuters, 13 September 2017. 
relations, it is widely understood that Serbian will have to formally recognise Kosovo 
before it can join. Although this cannot be a formal EU demand, given that five EU 
members – Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain – still do not recognise 
Kosovo, individual members are free to demand this as the price of their ratification 
of Serbian membership. Unless Belgrade is willing to make a major U-turn on its 
long-standing opposition to Kosovo’s statehood, the demand that it formally accept 
Kosovo is likely to be a major obstacle to its eventual membership. 
 
After Montenegro and Serbia, Macedonia and Albania are the next two likely 
members. However, neither has opened any chapters yet. In the case of Macedonia, 
which became a candidate for membership in 2005, long before any of the others, the 
country’s progress towards EU accession has been shaped by its ongoing dispute with 
Greece over its official name. Despite long-standing efforts by the United Nations to 
broker a solution, the two remain far apart in terms of how best to resolve the matter. 
As a result, Greece refuses to allow the opening of any chapters. Meanwhile, initial 
signs that the country was pursuing a radical reform programme have disappeared. 
(On the issue of the name dispute in relation to Macedonia’s EU accession process, 
see Ilievski and Taleski 2009; Tziampiris 2012.) Deprived of the chance at EU 
accession, the country has witnessed a progressive backsliding in terms of its 
adherence to democratic principles and the rule of law. In recent years, it has been 
mired in a prolonged political crisis. Although this now appears to have been 
resolved, it has done serious damage to the institutions of the country. As for Albania, 
it has made significant progress in recent years. Although it faces huge problems in 
terms of corruption, there are signs that things are now starting to improve. In 
recognition of this, the country was awarded candidacy in June 2014. 
 
At the back of the queue are Kosovo and Bosnia. In the case of Kosovo, progress has 
again been hampered by the fact that it does not enjoy full international recognition. 
At present, five EU members have yet to accept its statehood – although several of 
them maintain very cordial bilateral relations. Importantly, despite these differences, 
the European Union has managed to find a way to pursue Kosovo’s integration. For 
example, in the case of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, usually regarded 
as the first step in the accession process, it was agreed that this could be signed by the 
Union acting as a separate legal entity under the terms of the Lisbon Treaty, rather 
than be agreed by each individual member. While this has eased the situation, it has 
not provided a complete solution. As some point, the issue of its recognition will 
become a greater challenge (Ker-Lindsay and Economides, 2012). Finally, Bosnia 
presents a huge challenge for the European Union. Twenty years have now passed 
since the country’s brutal civil war was ended. Despite initial signs that the country 
was rebuilding, over the past decade the country’s political elites have become more 
and more at odds with one another. To many observers, the country is now 
completely dysfunctional. Again, the European Union has repeatedly tried to 
intervene, but with little success.  
 
 
The positions of member states on Western Balkans Enlargement 
 
As can be seen, the six countries of the Western Balkans are at very different stages of 
their accession processes. But just as it would be wrong to view the Western Balkans 
as a single entity in terms of enlargement, it would be equally wrong to view the 
position of the European Union in monolithic terms. There is a range of very different 
attitudes towards expansion in the region. To highlight this, this volume examines the 
approaches of seven EU members towards EU enlargement in the Western Balkans. 
In their different ways, they represent an interesting and representative spectrum of 
approaches towards expansion. The first to be considered are the EU’s Big Three: 
Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Next comes Italy, a major EU member 
that has a long tradition of engagement with the Western Balkans. Then come three 
regional states: Hungary, Greece and Cyprus. Each shows a very distinct approach 
towards enlargement – both in general terms and as it applies to the Western Balkans. 
 
Without doubt, Germany is now the single most important actor in terms of 
enlargement policy. And yet the country’s position on enlargement is complex. 
Unlike many other EU members, where enlargement policy is firmly within the hands 
of the government and receives scant wider attention, in Germany, the Parliament has 
extensive powers to shape the process. This makes enlargement truly political in a 
way that has rarely been the case elsewhere. Domestic politics and EU expansion are 
closely linked. Germany also retains close relations with the region. Almost one and 
half million people in Germany originate from the region. German businesses are 
active in the Western Balkans. Germany is a huge aid donor. It has also played a 
strong role in peacekeeping missions. It has also taken an increasingly active political 
role in the region. Along with Britain and France, it has been at the forefront of efforts 
to support Kosovo. Berlin also worked with London to try to help Bosnia. As 
Britain’s sway over the enlargement process has waned, Germany has stepped up its 
support for expansion. It is now, unquestionably, the single most important actor in 
the process. And yet, it has also established a reputation for being one of the strictest 
proponents of conditionality. While Germany is avowed supporter of enlargement, it 
also believes in the sanctity of the process, and the importance of ensuring that new 
members can meet their commitments and will not undermine the credibility or 
integrity of the European Union. 
 
In the case of France, support for enlargement has traditionally been far easier to 
understand. EU expansion has been seen by Paris as an effective means by which to 
extend its power. And yet, in recent years, France has been oddly absent from debates 
about EU enlargement in the Western Balkans. It was not involved in the British and 
German initiative to help try to stabilise Bosnia. Nor was it involved in the initial 
development of the Berlin Process. Indeed, until relatively recently, it appeared to 
have lost interest in the region. In part, this may be explained by the fact that, unlike 
Germany, policy making in this area remains firmly in the hands of officials. Also, 
while there are strong historical links between France and the Balkans, the 
contemporary ties are weaker. The community from the Balkans is small. Moreover, 
in a region where many still dream of emigrating, few would consider moving to 
France. Nor is the region given much media attention. Where it does receive attention, 
the focus is often negative. In recent years, though, French interest appears to have 
been growing again. For example, Paris hosted the Berlin Process summit in 2016. 
More to the point, its support for expansion appears to run in conjunction with 
Germany. Like Berlin, Paris is keen to stress the integrity of the European project. 
 
The United Kingdom is a particularly interesting case to consider. Historically, it has 
been at the forefront of efforts to enlarge the European Union. In large part, this was 
based on a deep scepticism about longer-term trends towards closer political union, 
with the possibility that this could even lead to a federal Europe. Traditionally, 
European expansion was regarded by British policy makers as the best way to prevent 
this from happening. Widening the European Union would stave off efforts to deepen 
the process of European integration. For this reason, Britain led the efforts to expand 
the European Union in the late-1990s and early 2000s. It was also the most 
enthusiastic member in terms of welcoming the extension of the freedom of 
movement to the wave of new entrants that joined the EU in 2004. In retrospect, this 
would have disastrous consequences. The number of new arrivals far exceeded 
expectations. Coupled with Britain’s longstanding widespread mistrust of the EU, and 
a creeping encroachment on the UK’s sovereignty, this surge in new arrivals provided 
a fertile ground for a rise in populist hard Euroscepticism, if not outright Europhobic 
nationalism. Since 2010, there has been a marked decline in Britain support for 
enlargement. While British officials would declare that the EU’s expansion remained 
a British policy, the degree of support for new members from the Balkans has been 
tepid, at best. With few ties to the region, there was no overriding reason for London 
to support their entry to the Union. In a final ironic twist to the story, Britain’s support 
for enlargement, and its willingness to extend full rights to new EU citizens from day 
one, laid the foundations for its decision, in June 2016, to leave the European Union. 
Having once been the champion of expansion, Britain now finds that its voice on 
enlargement has been muted. 
 
Italy is also a very interesting case. Sitting on the other side of the Adriatic, it has long 
taken a close interest in the Western Balkans and has proven to be a vocal supporter 
of the European perspective. However, the roots of its support for EU enlargement in 
the region are overwhelmingly shaped by economic interests and security concerns. 
Italy is a major investor in the region. And yet, for all its interests in the Western 
Balkans, which should give it a powerful say in EU policy towards the region, Italy 
also represents an interesting example of how a country that has a strong belief in EU 
enlargement, and close ties to the Western Balkans, has been unable to convert this in 
to strong political significance. It is notable that Italy was absent in the early stages of 
the Berlin Process. It also failed to play a part in the British-German initiative on 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. This failure can in part be attributed to a lack of resources. 
While Italian officials and companies have excellent ties across the region, the 
government has persistently failed to prioritise the region politically. Interestingly, 
despite its proximity, the region attracts scant interest amongst the population at large. 
When it does come to the forefront of attention, it is often in a negative way. 
Ultimately, the picture that emerges is of a country that sees the financial and security 
benefits of expansion in the Western Balkans, and wants to play a more significant 
role, but lacks the wherewithal to convert this into a leading role in EU policy circles.  
 
Moving beyond the larger members of the Union, enlargement also plays an 
important role in the national politics of many other members. One of the most 
interesting, and yet relatively neglected, is Hungary. It is a significant actor not only 
because it neighbours the Western Balkans to the north, but because of its extensive 
historical and cultural ties to the region. Then there are also important domestic 
political factors at play in the form of the Hungarian national minorities in parts of the 
Balkans. Budapest uses its leverage as a member of the EU to press for greater 
minority rights for Hungarians. It also made this a key plank of its support for Serbian 
accession. However, support for enlargement goes beyond narrow communal 
interests. It is also tied to wider Hungarian foreign policy goals. And yet, in doing so, 
it also exposes fundamental tensions in Hungary’s relationship with the EU. On the 
one hand, the Hungarian government is wholly committed towards EU expansion in 
the Western Balkans. In the face of ‘enlargement fatigue’ it has sought to encourage 
the other members to hold the faith and continue to offer a European perspective to 
the Western Balkans. And yet, Hungary also has a difficult, if not wholly strained, 
relationship with the EU. The administration of Prime Minister Viktor Orban has 
taken a sharply illiberal turn in recent years and has become increasingly opposed to 
what they see as the influence of ‘Brussels’ in national affairs. As a result, Hungary’s 
ability to press the case for the faster accession of the Western Balkans has been 
compromised. The situation has also been complicated by the 2015 migration crisis, 
which saw Hungary enforce extremely punitive measures to refugees from crossing 
its border with Serbia, thereby forcing them westwards to Croatia and the Slovenia. 
This did considerable harm to its relations with many of its EU partners, and put ties 
with neighbouring Serbia under strain for a time. However, more recently, the 
Hungarian government has been able to use its opposition to migration to strengthen 
its standing amongst the more illiberal regimes in the Balkans. In this regard, Hungary 
could be jeopardising EU conditionality as a cornerstone of the accession process. 
 
Meanwhile, at the southern end of the Balkans lies Greece. Like Hungary, it too has 
placed a high degree of emphasis on enlargement. Indeed, perhaps more than in any 
other EU member state, it has used expansion for its own ends. And yet its position on 
the issue is also oddly ambivalent. On the one hand, it remains declaratively, and even 
in periods of enlargement fatigue, one of the most ardent supporters of the inclusion 
of the whole region into the EU. In doing so, it has used this to increase its general 
influence in the region. On the other hand, it is also an obstructing factor, often a 
particularly obstinate one, whenever its multiple interests in the Balkans produce 
frictions and towards candidates with which Athens has disputes. In other words, it 
has used its power to block as a very specific tool to increase its leverage in certain 
cases -  most notably in terms of the Macedonia name issue. As is shown, the Greek 
position cannot be properly understood without reference to three key factors. In the 
first instance, it is important to understand the particularities of Greece’s foreign 
policy making. Secondly, it is crucial to consider the background of Greece’s 
relationship with the region and the legacy of multiple disputes that were created or 
exacerbated in the early post-Communist period. Finally, there is the legacy of the 
1990s of turning EU enlargement policy into a Greek foreign policy tool. Taken 
together, these factors not only explain the existence and persistence of Greece’s 
ambivalent attitudes and policies, but also indicate that the factors are likely to 
continue to shape Greece’s enlargement policy in the future. In this context, it is 
likely that in the coming years Greece will engage in a delicate balance of 
strategically placing conditionality to ensure favourable compromises with 
neighbours, while not jeopardizing the continuation of the enlargement process per se. 
In many ways, Greece is the clearest example of how an EU member state has 
instrumentalised enlargement to secure its national interests and foreign policy goals. 
 
Finally, there is the case of Cyprus. Along with Hungary, it is one of the wave of the 
2004 entrants to the European Union. However, while Cyprus is geographically a part 
of South East Europe, it has in fact taken a rather distant approach to the question of 
enlargement in the Western Balkans. In part, this is due to its long-standing focus on 
its ‘national issue’, the division of the island and UN-sponsored efforts to reach a 
negotiated settlement to the ‘Cyprus Problem’. This has tended to mean that the island 
has adopted an instrumental and transactional approach towards foreign policy. The 
amount of effort its devoted to external relations with countries was directly related to 
the importance attached to their position on the Cyprus issue. Alongside the five 
permanent members of the Security Council, Cyprus has tended to focus its attention 
on Muslim states, which could recognise the self-declared ‘Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus’, and the large bloc of developing states that can give it votes in the 
UN General Assembly. Interestingly, during the Cold War, this meant that 
Yugoslavia had real significance given its role as a lead actor in the Non-Aligned 
Movement, a key body for marshalling the support of the developing world. However, 
in the post-Cold War era, and with the break-up of Yugoslavia, the Western Balkans 
ceased to be of much direct interest to Cyprus. When Cyprus did take an interest, it 
was to support Greece over the Macedonia name issue, or oppose Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence, which was viewed as a direct threat to its national 
interests. More generally, it has held the region at arm’s length. It has few direct 
contacts with the region. To this end, Cyprus has had a relatively disinterested 
approach towards enlargement in the Balkans, which stands in stark contrast to the 
amount of attention given to the region by Greece. In this sense, enlargement in the 
Western Balkans is the clearest example of how, despite predictions to the contrary, 
Cypriot and Greek foreign policy have diverged, and how geographic proximity will 
not always mean that a country is interested in its neighbourhood. Ultimately, Cyprus 
is interesting because it has been so very uninvolved in the question of enlargement in 
the Western Balkans.  
 
 
The national politics of EU enlargement in the Western Balkans 
 
Taken together, the seven case studies in this volume provide some valuable findings 
to explain the reasons why states support EU enlargement in the Western Balkans. 
Beyond its generic support of the ideal of the European Union bringing Europe 
together, it is possible to discern specific national reasons for supporting enlargement. 
Sometimes, there are strong links to the region that drive support for the process. This 
is seen particularly clearly in the case of Germany. The large diaspora community 
ensures that there are significant ties. Likewise, there is a strong business case for 
enlargement, which is also seen in the case of Italy. However, ties of population and 
commercial links are a comparatively rare elsewhere. In several cases, countries 
support enlargement to promote their own prestige. For France, this is about building 
a wider Europe in which it plays a lead role. A larger, more powerful Europe means a 
more powerful France. For others, such as Greece and Hungary, it is about building 
influence amongst EU member states, as well as amongst the candidates. Greece also 
shows the power of EU enlargement to achieve wider foreign policy goals, such as 
building ties with certain candidates, such as Serbia, or using the process to exert 
leverage over others, as happens in the case of Macedonia, with the purpose to resolve 
its bilateral disputes. Perhaps most unusually, enlargement can sometimes be used as 
a tool to shape the EU in a direction favoured by a member state. The most glaring 
example is the case of Britain. Lastly, in some countries, as exemplified by Cyprus, 
there appears to be no discernible national reason to support enlargement over and 
above the wider EU goal of expansion. 
 
Balanced against support for enlargement, there are also some interesting conclusions 
that can be drawn about concerns over EU expansion. (‘Opposition’ would be too 
strong a word as no state actively opposes it). For France and Germany, the European 
project is paramount. They want to ensure that enlargement into the Western Balkans 
will not undermine the integrity of the EU. This is undoubtedly driven by the many 
concerns that have been raised about the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, which 
many regarded as premature and done primarily for political reasons. This means that 
expansion in the Western Balkans is being driven by a much greater commitment to 
conditionality than was perhaps the case in previous waves of enlargement. Another 
common thread is concern over security. It is widely accepted that the Western 
Balkans plays a major role in organised crime and various forms of trafficking in 
Europe. Finally, concerns over migration, and the freedom of movement, has also 
become increasingly prominent in member states (Grabbe, 2014; Ker-Lindsay, 2017). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite the problems faced by the European Union, enlargement remains a flagship 
policy. However, expansion is a far more complex process than is often 
acknowledged, either by policy makers or by scholars. While the institutional 
dimensions of enlargement are undoubtedly important, and generally well-
understood, it is also vital to recognise the role played by domestic political dynamics 
within member states. Although meeting the basic standards of economic and political 
openness, and conforming to the terms of the acquis are both necessary conditions for 
membership, doing so is not wholly sufficient for accession. Member states must give 
their approval. This veto power is not subject to appeal or oversight. Nor can it be 
outdone by the collective votes of other members. It is an absolute and uncontested 
prerogative of members. To this extent, national politics matter enormously. 
 
Although the role of domestic politics within member states in the accession process 
may be accepted in general terms, very little research has been conducted on the 
subject. Few efforts have been made to investigate the way in which individual 
member states conceptualise enlargement in a broad sense, let alone how they 
approach enlargement in regional or country-specific terms. This collection is an 
attempt to investigate the way in which a variety of member states approach 
enlargement and highlight the true range of differences that exist within members 
over the question of the future expansion of the European Union. It tries to remedy 
this lacuna in the literature by providing a range of case studies prepared in such a 
way as to maximise their comparative value. Given the range of issues at stake, the 
Western Balkans is therefore a valuable testing ground for examining the wide range 
of issues that underpin member state support or opposition towards enlargement. 
What it shows is that the national politics of EU enlargement are not only very 
different, they are driven by very different and often very specific national concerns. 
They are also open to change. This needs to be more explicitly recognised. The 
support of countries can alter over time. The EU needs to respond to this, as do 
aspiring members. 
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